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Abstract 
According to Sohn-Rethel there is a “secret identity” between commodity form and 
thought form. Commodity exchange is a real abstraction – embodied in money – and 
constitutes a social a priori which reflects itself in the conceptual abstraction, i.e., in the 
abstract thought typical of commodity-producing societies: philosophy (in ancient 
Greece) and modern science (in capitalism). However, the theory of Sohn-Rethel has a 
fundamental flaw: its exclusive identification of the real abstraction with the sphere of 
circulation results in the ontologisation of labour which, on the contrary, is a capitalist 
specificity and the original source of the abstraction in this society.      
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abstraction according to Sohn-Rethel
1
 
 
 
“It is as if alongside and external to lions, tigers, 
rabbits, and all other actual animals […] there 
existed also in addition the animal, the individual 
incarnation of the entire animal kingdom.” 
Karl Marx 
 
1 – Introduction 
Alfred Sohn-Rethel (1899-1990) is probably one of the most neglected authors in 
the context of the so-called “Western Marxism”. Greatly influenced by the Critical 
Theory of the Frankfurt School – he met Benjamin, Adorno, Horkheimer and Bloch in 
the 1920s and 1930s –, Sohn-Rethel remained always an outsider to the academic world 
and had to struggle throughout his life with major financial problems.   
He never gave up, however, defending his main thesis: “The intellectual work of 
my life […] served to clarify […] a somewhat intuitive view I had in 1921 [while still a 
college student] […]: the discovery of the [Kantian] transcendental subject in the 
commodity form”.2 This proposition about the “secret identity” between the real 
abstraction present in commodity exchange and the conceptual abstraction of thought 
form3 would earn him since very early on a great mistrust, and even the epithet of 
“crazy” (!) by Alfred Weber, his doctoral advisor.4    
Sohn-Rethel is forced to emigrate to England, in 1937, following the Nazi upsurge, 
where he meets George Thomson, the only person who had also acknowledged the 
connection between philosophy and money, in his studies on ancient Greece.5 
Notwithstanding, only after his return to Germany will Sohn-Rethel finally achieve 
notoriety, with the publication of his magnum opus: Intellectual and Manual Labour,6 
in 1970. He was still able to get a brief appointment at the University of Bremen, 
between 1972 and 1976.      
As Jappe notes, “Sohn-Rethel is one of the few Marxists” who can help us 
“understand the XXI century”, since he recovers the “most valuable and fundamental 
core” of Marx”s theory: “the analysis of the logic of value and of the commodity”.7 In 
fact, he was able to discern that the distinctive characteristic of capitalism is the 
“abstraction” it imposes on social life. With the concept of real abstraction, “Sohn-
Rethel gave a very important contribution to the elaboration of the critique of 
commodity fetishism”,8 standing as one of the forerunners of the denominated “New 
Value Critique”.9     
Sohn-Rethel’s main thesis is that there is not only an analogy but a “true identity” 
between the formal elements of the social synthesis – “the network of relations by 
which society forms a coherent whole”10 – and the formal elements of thought. “The 
conceptual basis of cognition is logically and historically conditioned by the basic 
formation of the social synthesis of its epoch”.11 Therefore, “the categories are historical 
by origin and social by nature”.12 In other words, “the socially necessary forms of 
thought of an epoch are those in conformity with the socially synthetic functions of that 
epoch”.13 
 In the context of commodity production, it is (commodity) exchange which 
possesses a socially synthetic function through the abstraction it gives rise to, centred on 
the functions of money as the “universal equivalent”. The formal elements which 
constitute the exchange abstraction resemble unequivocally the conceptual elements of 
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the cognitive faculty emerging with the spread of commodity production. According to 
the author, as conceptual elements, these forms constitute the basic principles of thought 
both of Greek philosophy and modern natural science, and are at the origin of the 
separation between intellectual and manual labour.14     
To sum up, in market societies the social synthesis is performed by the categories 
themselves in such a way that the cognitive faculty they engender is an a priori social 
capability of the mind. In this sense, Kant was right by claiming that  
 
the basic constituents of our form of cognition are performed and issue from a prior 
origin, but he was wrong in attributing this pre-formation to the mind itself 
engaged in the phantasmagorical performance of “transcendental synthesis a 
priori”, locatable neither in time nor in place.15  
 
Nonetheless, we should emphasize that Sohn-Rethel’s theory presents several flaws 
because it locates the source of the real abstraction in the sphere of circulation,16 since, 
in is his view, “production [...] is a a-social and supra-historic metabolism with 
nature”.17 On the contrary, only in capitalist societies does “labour” constitute the social 
bond; in the societies of the past, productive activity was “object of conscious decisions 
taken on the other spheres of life”,18 and so it did not represent a separated and 
autonomized realm. Furthermore, if in Marx it is “abstract labour” which confers the 
products their “objectivity of value”, i.e., constitutes the “substance of value”, to Sohn-
Rethel it is exchange that is responsible for the value of commodities.19      
From here stems the main difference, as we shall see, between the Sohn-Rethelian 
theory of “real abstraction” and that of the New Value Critique. In short, Sohn-Rethel 
fails to see that    
 
the abstraction in the act of exchange does no more than to fulfil the abstraction 
[already] created in production, in which labour is concrete as a material process, 
but not to its producers as social beings. It was the mode of capitalist production 
which turned circulation into a total form, and not the other way around.20  
 
In this article, we begin by analyzing the relation between real abstraction and 
conceptual abstraction in Sohn-Rethel’s view, explaining the formal elements of 
exchange and its relation to the fundaments of abstract thought (section 2). Then we 
present the historical relation between the forms of social synthesis and the different 
thought forms they originate (section 3), paying a special attention to capitalism and its 
connection with modern science (section 4). Finally, we present a critical analysis of the 
Sohn-Rethelian oeuvre in light of the New Value Critique (section 5).   
 
2 – Real Abstraction and Conceptual Abstraction  
2.1 – The critique of epistemology as a complement to the critique of political economy  
The work of Sohn-Rethel intends to answer one of the great epistemological 
questions, namely “what is the origin of the forms of consciousness, of those ‘grids’ 
[grilles] which allow every individual to organize the multiple data provided by sensible 
perception […]?”21 To this day, two fundamental answers were given to this question: 
 
those categories are either themselves of empirical origin, the result of the 
constancy of experience, but without absolute validity and without allowing the 
deduction of a priori judgments […] . This is the empiricist answer, from David 
Hume to Paul Feyerabend. Or else an ontological structure is presupposed, 
practically innate to man, which everywhere and in every time organizes in the 
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same a priori manner a material that is unknowable (inconnosaible) as such. This 
is, of course, the solution proposed by Kant.22  
       
In an original way, Sohn-Rethel suggests a third hypothesis: “the origin of the 
forms of consciousness (and of knowledge) is neither empirical nor ontological, but 
historical”.23 The forms of thought derive from human action; however, not from action 
as such, “as a category itself philosophical and abstract, but from the historical and 
concrete action of man” 24 as a social being. This is in accord with the Marxian thesis 
that it is social reality which determines human consciousness, and not the reverse. In 
other words, forms of consciousness are the “expression of human social relations in a 
given time”, being in that specific context that they acquire an “objective validity”.25   
Marxian categories express simultaneously particular social relationships and forms 
of thought.26 Therefore, according to Sohn-Rethel, the analysis of the commodity form, 
which constitutes the cornerstone of the critique of political economy developed by 
Marx, can also serve as point of departure to a critique of “bourgeois” epistemology, 
particularly that of Kant.    
The problem of knowledge must be related to the theory of Kant, obviously not as 
the “a-historical [question] of ‘knowledge as such’”, but as the “specific historical 
phenomenon [marked] by the separation between intellectual and manual labour, which 
appears […] in an completely developed form for the first time among the ancient 
classics and then, in its turn, mainly in the modern European era”.27  
If in the prevalent epistemological theories scientific and philosophic “intellectual” 
labour, i.e., the conceptual form of thought, is characterized by the historical 
“timelessness” of its content and “that a-historicity is accepted as a given basis”, Sohn-
Rethel, in his turn, suggests the study of the “forms of emergence of intellectual labour 
and its separation from manual labour as a partial historical-materialist problem”, that 
is, the embeddedness of the “question of knowledge in its Kantian formulation […] on 
the ground of the historical materialism induced by Hegel”.28       
The author proclaims, therefore, the thesis of a “social origin of pure reason”, 
deducting the pure concepts of reason from the “abstract physicality of the act of 
exchange”. The abstraction is a space-time reality, but occurs “behind the backs” of the 
persons involved.29 In this sense, the Kantian “transcendental unity of self-
consciousness” is the intellectual reflection of one of the elements of the exchange 
abstraction: the form of exchangeability of the commodities underlying the unity of 
money and social synthesis.  
By providing the (material) carrier in which the real abstraction is embodied, 
money helps to understand the “logical uniformity of the exchange abstraction” present 
in all the individuals of a market society: the key categories of their conceptual thought 
reproduce the formal elements of the real abstraction.30  
 The “transcendental subject” can thus be defined “as a fetish concept of the capital 
function of money”.31 This false consciousness culminates in the Descartes” ego cogito: 
“the formation of thinking which in every respect merits the term “social” presents itself 
as the diametrical opposite to society, the Ego”.32 
The social structure of commodity exchange rests on the non-empirical abstraction 
of the act of exchange and reveals a “formal equality with the abstraction of the basic 
methodological concepts of exact natural science”. It can be said that “the abstraction of 
exchange is not thought but possesses the form of thought in pure categories of 
reason”.33  
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We can conclude that, unlike Kant, Sohn-Rethel traces back the mental abstraction 
to the structural conditions which are on the basis of socialisation and not to the 
“idealist phantasmagorias of the transcendental Subject or Spirit”34:  
 
The birth of pure reason occurs […] not in or trough man, nor step by step, with the 
formation of the empirical concepts of our ordinary language, but through an 
[already] formed abstractness, finished and identical to all individuals [facing it] 
[…]. Through that [abstractness], pure reason is a potency disengaged from human 
psychology and produced apart from human subjectivity. […] Reason is a 
completely reified human power, to which the physicality of the act of exchange 
transmits itself in the form of the conversion of the real abstraction into thought 
abstraction. […] Thus, far from being the brilliant illustration of men’s spiritual 
autonomy, which idealism sees in it, the capability of understanding of civilized 
men presupposes … the extension of the depth and opacity of reification.35     
 
Following Sohn-Rethel’s line of thought,36 we will analyse in the next pages the 
three major ideas that guide his work: commodity exchange is the original source of the 
abstraction; this (real) abstraction entails the formal elements essential to the cognitive 
faculty of conceptual thought; the real abstraction engenders the “ideal abstraction” 
common to both Greek philosophy and modern science.   
 
2.2 – Commodity Exchange, real abstraction and social synthesis 
Sohn-Rethel tells us that his first writings, namely those of the 1930s, should be 
seen as a mere “stage of self-development; those works should not be judged in 
themselves, but according to the clarification they have finally and definitively brought 
me: that which is presented in my 1970 book [Intellectual and Manual Labour]”.37 
Nonetheless, we find already in those writings the fundamental thesis which 
constitutes the core of Sohn-Rethelian thought, at least in its embryonic stage:    
 
Are not perhaps the unity of self-consciousness and the subject of knowledge, in reality, 
from the start, only an unavoidable intellectual reflection of the unity of money, 
discursive thought [only] a form of consciousness conditioned by the function of money 
in a society mediated by commodities, and rational knowledge of the object only the ideal 
reproduction of the ways in which production according to the laws of commodity 
exchange is performed in that society? This assumption seems at first sight a bold 
hypothesis, which carries with it severe consequences. Nevertheless, we want to consider 
it because we think it could be proven right. This hypothesis, in fact, goes as far as saying 
that the forms of consciousness, which we call forms of knowledge in the rational sense, 
arose from the reification present in commodity exchange.
38  
    
The primitive version of the “phenomenological” analysis of exchange is already 
found in his “Critical Liquidation of Apriorism”.39 However, there is a great emphasis 
in exploitation as the source of reification40 instead of the description of the formal 
elements of exchange, as will be the case in Intellectual and Manual Labour.41  
The further developments and results of his research in the following decades 
became known only in the form of short essays (cf., for example, Sohn-Rethel, 1965). It 
is only in 1970, when the author is finally able to publish is main work, which the first 
detailed presentation of its theory sees the light of day and a major interest in it arises42. 
In the following pages, thus, we turn ourselves to the analysis of his magnum opus.       
 
2.2.1 – The commodity abstraction  
Let us listen to Sohn-Rethel: 
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The form of commodity is abstract and abstractness governs its whole orbit. [...] In 
the form of money riches become abstract riches and, as owner of such riches, man 
himself becomes an abstract man, a private property-owner. [...] [Therefore,] a 
society in which commodity exchange forms the nexus rerum is a purely abstract 
set of relations where everything concrete is in private hands.43  
 
Yet the essence of the commodity abstraction is the fact that it is not thought-
induced, i.e., it does not owe its origin to men’s minds but to their actions: “It is 
abstraction in its precise, literal sense”.44 The economic concept of value resulting from 
it is characterized by a complete absence of quality, by a purely quantitative 
differentiation applicable to any kind of commodity. As we shall see further on, this 
characteristic of the abstraction “value” reveals a remarkable similarity with the 
fundamental categories of quantitative natural science:    
While the concepts of natural science are thought abstractions, the economic 
concept of value is a real one. It exists nowhere other than in the human mind but it 
does not spring from it. Rather it is purely social in character, arising in the spatio-
temporal sphere of human inter-relations.45 
 
In his analysis, Marx makes the distinction between “use-value” and “exchange-
value” the main feature of the commodity. Sohn-Rethel, in his turn, draws this 
distinction in terms of the corresponding human activities: “actions of use” and “actions 
of exchange”.46 Use and exchange are mutually exclusive in time. Use refers to the 
material processes by which men secure their livelihood, to that which Marx calls 
interchange or “metabolism with nature.” This material practice is suspended during the 
act of exchange, which has nothing of natural about it: it is something purely social in 
terms of its constitution and scope. Although exchange implies the negation of the 
corporeal reality of use and use-value, it entails, nonetheless, a “physical reality”: the 
movement in time and space of the commodities from one owner to the other.47 
Capitalist social synthesis is realized by exchange and not by use.48        
The salient feature of the act of exchange is that its separation from use takes on the 
blind necessity of an “objective social law”. But the abstractness of exchange does not 
apply to consciousness of the people who trade: the consciousness of the actors is 
occupied with the potential (and “concrete”) use of the things to be exchanged, so that it 
is the act of exchange which performs “unconsciously” the abstraction. The act of 
exchange, and only the act, is abstract, so that the consciousness and the action of the 
persons involved go separate ways.49      
As commodity production develops, the imagination of man becomes ever more 
separated from its actions and individualised, assuming the dimension of a private 
consciousness, which makes it impossible the “direct” transference of the forms of 
exchange – real abstraction – to human consciousness. Therefore, the exchange 
abstraction enters their consciousnesses only after the act of exchange has taken place, 
“when they are faced with the completed result of the circulation of the commodities”: 
money, “in which the abstractness assumes a separate embodiment”.50 
To sum up, the value or commodity abstraction should be seen as a “real 
abstraction” deriving from the social human activity and, in its turn, this “abstraction 
contained in exchange [...] determines the conceptual mode of thinking peculiar to 
societies based on commodity production”.51 Nevertheless, people become aware of the 
commodity abstraction “only when they come face to face with the result which their 
own actions have engendered ‘behind their backs’”52: money. 
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2.2.2 – The formal elements of exchange 
Sohn-Rethel enumerates a set of formal elements inherent to commodity exchange: 
(i) practical solipsism; (ii) the form of exchangeability of commodities; (iii) abstract 
quantity; (iv) abstract space and time; (v) substance and accidents. As we shall see, all 
these formal characteristics have a near perfect correspondence with the formal 
elements of thought. But let us describe them in a little more detail.     
In the first place, on the basis of commodity production is a condition of “reciprocal 
independence”.53 Commodity exchange impels solipsism among the persons involved in 
it, i.e., it is not dependent on what they communicate with each other. “The doctrine that 
between all people, for every one of them, solus ipse (I alone) exist is only a 
philosophical formulation of the principles that in practice regulate exchange”.54  
Thus, the form of the interrelation of commodity exchange shapes the 
psychological mechanisms of the individuals whose life it dominates, “mechanisms 
which they then conceive of as inborn, human nature. [...] They consider themselves to 
have acted in self-interest although in fact they have merely obeyed the laws of the 
exchange nexus. The practical solipsism of commodity exchanging owners is nothing 
but the practice of private property as a basis of social relations”.55 The act of exchange 
is social, while the mind of the people involved in it is private: the result is a change in 
the statute of commodities as private propriety.56    
Secondly, commodities are exchangeable by virtue of being objects capable of a 
mutual exclusion of propriety.57 The indivisibility or unity of the commodity does not 
derive from its material features but from its social features: the singleness of its (social) 
existence constitutes the form of exchangeability of commodities. This exchangeability 
applies to every commodity, regardless of its material properties.58 The commodity 
belongs to a unified world common to all private individuals, so that exchange confers 
the social synthesis its unity.59 Money functions as the concrete, material carrier of the 
form of exchangeability of commodities and expresses its oneness.       
The abstraction refers to the interrelation of the actors of exchange and not to the 
actors themselves. This is so because it is not the individuals who cause the social 
synthesis but their actions. We are faced here with a pure abstraction that possesses, 
however, a spatio-temporal reality and takes on a separate representation in money, a 
relation that is formalized only in terms of human understanding. “Money is an abstract 
thing, a paradox in itself – a thing that performs its socially synthetic function without 
any human understanding”.60 The function of money is not related to our natural or 
physical being; it is comprehensible only in the framework of our interrelations as 
human beings. Money does not possess any meaning outside the human mind and, 
nonetheless, “has definite reality outside it - a social reality”.61        
Thirdly, exchange contains a postulate of equality between the two commodities to 
be exchanged. “They are equated by virtue of being exchanged, they are not exchanged 
by virtue of any [material] equality which they possess”.62 The transformation of human 
relations in relations between things, i.e., the reifying character of exchange, is 
connected to this equalizing effect of the act of exchange on the objects traded.63 The 
equalisation produced by exchange overcomes all the specific dimensional 
measurements and establishes a realm of non-dimensional quantity, of quantity tout 
court. “In other words, the postulate of the exchange equation abstracts quantity in a 
manner which constitutes the foundation of free mathematical reasoning”.64 
Fourthly, this abstraction of pure quantity achieves a greater importance when 
related to the corresponding abstraction concerning time and space. Exchange imposes 
an abstraction from all (material) activities that form the “metabolism with nature” since 
the objects exchanged are assumed immutable during the transaction. “Exchange 
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empties time and space of their material contents and gives them contents of purely 
human significance connected with the social status of people and things”.65 In other 
words, unlike past societies, time and space are no longer specific – associated to 
specific events and phenomena – but become abstract.  
Finally, with the duplication of the commodity in commodity and money, “its 
propertyless and persistent substantiality mirrors itself in the indistinctive materiality of 
money”.66 As such, the immutable and non-descriptive nature of the commodity as 
exchange-value reflects its substance, while its specific properties as use-value 
constitute its accidents.67      
 
The act of exchange has to be described as abstract movement through abstract 
(homogenous, continuous, and empty) space and time of abstract substances 
(materially real but bare of sense-qualities) which thereby suffer no material 
change and which allow for none but quantitative differentiation (differentiation in 
abstract, non-dimensional quantity).
68  
 
The key-point to be retained is that the “formal features of exchange […] constitute 
a mechanism of real abstraction indispensable for the social synthesis throughout and 
supplying a matrix for the abstract conceptual reasoning characteristic of all societies 
based on commodity production”.69 The pattern of movement inherent to the exchange 
abstraction introduces a concept of nature as an “objective material world”, a world 
from which man, as a social subject, has withdrawn himself. Abstract (infinite) time and 
abstract (unlimited) space provide a conception of nature antithetical to society. In fact, 
a clear idea of nature emerges only in the age of commodity production, overcoming the 
anthropomorphisms of tribal societies grounded on communal production.70      
In modern societies we can distinguish, therefore, two “physicalities”: one, 
“concrete and material”, comprises commodities as objects of use and the human 
activities corresponding to the material interchange with nature – it is a “primary 
nature”; the other, “abstract and purely social”, concerns the commodities as objects of 
exchange and quantities of value – it is a synthetic, “second nature” created 
(unconsciously) by man. “Both are real in time and space; primary nature is created by 
human labour, second nature is ruled by relations of property”.71 
The abstraction from primary nature engendered by exchange, through its 
separation from use, imposes itself as an abstract “physicality” or, better yet, as a kind 
of abstract nature, “devoid of all sense reality and admits only of quantitative 
differentiation. Furthermore it is understandable solely to people acquainted with money 
and engaged in the use and acquisition of it” 72, i.e., in the context of “civilization” born 
in Ancient Greece. The social and purely abstract reality of exchange exists only in 
men”s mind but does not spring from it. It arises out of the act of exchange, of its 
necessity implied by private production carried on independently by individuals.      
In this sense, Sohn-Rethel reaches the following conclusion: “This real abstraction 
is the arsenal from which intellectual labour throughout the eras of commodity 
exchange draws its conceptual resources. It was the historical matrix of Greek 
philosophy and it is still the matrix of the conceptual paradigms of science as we know 
it”.73 The changes in these paradigms indicate changes occurring in the structural 
framework underlying them and vice-versa, “because the socially necessary forms of 
cognition in any epoch have no source from which they can originate other than the 
prevailing functionalism of the social synthesis”.74   
 
2.2.3 – The conversion of the real abstraction into the conceptual abstraction and the 
“independent intellect” 
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Let us recapitulate: it is only the act of exchange which exerts a social effect; the 
consciousness of the individuals is private and ignores the socially synthetic character 
of their actions. We can speak of a “second nature” that encompasses a “socially 
synthetic reality in historical time and space and the ideal form of cognition through 
abstract concepts”.75 Second nature includes, therefore, the commodity form 
(understood only as the act of exchange) – i.e., the “real abstraction” – and the abstract 
thought form (philosophy and science), i.e., the “conceptual abstraction”.  
The real abstraction converts into its ideal reflection or intellectual form. This 
“conversion” requires as point of departure the use of coined money – the only 
“palpable” aspect of the real abstraction – in commercial trade.76 There is no matter in 
nature fully in accord with the stuff of which money is made. All existing materials are 
perishable, transient, corruptible, subject to the effects of time, etc. Money is something 
real and, yet, unlike any other sensible quality by which reality is considered real for us. 
By not possessing sensible qualities, money is indestructible, eternal.77 
Underlying this monetary function is the general commodity abstraction “which 
allows for, and indeed enforces the formation of non-empirical concepts of pure thought 
when this abstraction becomes mentally identified in its given spatio-temporal 
reality”.78 The “immaterial”, non-empirical matter, of which money should virtually be 
made of, can only be represented genuinely outside the “common realm of natural 
matter and empirical perception; in other words: only in the form of the non-empirical 
or “pure” concept”.79 
 
The fact that the reflecting medium of the real abstraction is coinage accounts for 
the creation of logical uniformity of the intellectual abstraction among all 
conceptual thinkers in an exchange society of a given stage [of development] and 
formation. […] The basic categories of intellectual labour […] are replicas of the 
elements of the real abstraction.80  
 
What differentiates intellectual labour from manual labour is precisely its use of 
non-empirical form-abstractions, representable only with the use of pure, non-empirical 
concepts. These abstract thought forms stem from the real abstraction of exchange, 
itself non-empirical and purely social. This is the only way to decipher the origin and 
“the nature of intellectual labour and of science and yet avoid idealism”.81 Greek 
philosophy constitutes the first historical manifestation of the separation between head 
and hand.      
The historical origin of conceptual thought is translated, in its totally developed 
form, into the rise of “pure intellect” completely divorced from man’s physical 
activities.82 This intellect, in its turn, applies itself to external reality – society and 
nature – according to the “object” which is familiar to it – the objective pattern of 
thought transposed from the commodity abstraction and its formal characteristics.83 The 
science guiding the intellectual labour stemming from second nature is founded in a 
non-empirical abstraction and in a priori concepts of nature. Thus, the already 
mentioned formal elements of exchange – abstract space and time, abstract matter, 
abstract mathematical quantity, abstract movement, etc. – constitute a framework of 
analysis likewise abstract, capable of comprising all observable phenomena.84       
The notion of nature as a physical objective world independent of man – the 
division between society and nature – arises when commodity production reaches its 
peak as a monetary economy, i.e., “when social relations assume the impersonal and 
reified character of commodity exchange”. The non-empirical concepts stemming from 
the real abstraction have an “objective reality” because they describe action reduced to 
an elementary physical reality, that is, they describe the “absolute minimum 
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[denominator] of what can constitute a natural event”, so that they represent the 
paradigm of mechanistic thinking.85 
“[A]s a general rule” the form of thought “will conform to the make-up of the 
existing social formation based on commodity production. The reasoning itself, 
however, is totally impervious to this conformity since its alienation blinds it to [the 
form of] society”.86 The abstraction is on the basis (and in the result) of exchange but 
that fact eludes intellect, which is destined to “be alienated by false consciousness when 
it tries to explain its own mode of thinking”.87  
According to Sohn-Rethel, “the valid foundations of the science of an epoch are 
those in keeping with the social synthesis of that epoch.” Therefore, the “significant 
changes in the formation of the social synthesis indeed entail corresponding changes in 
the formation of science”.88 In fact, as we shall see further on, the development of 
modern science went along with the rise of modern capitalism.89 The discovery of the 
so-called natural laws is the goal of the mathematical and experimental method of 
“exact” science born with Galileo and Newton.  
We can conclude that, in commodity production, intellectual labour and social 
thought are necessarily separated from physical labour. Material production loses its 
direct social cohesion and is able to form a viable totality only through a network of 
exchanges performed under the aegis of private propriety which, as capital, controls 
production and subjects manual labour to exploitation. Manual labour is spoiled of the 
knowledge governing its activities.90   
 
3 – Commodity Form and Thought Form: historical evolution 
Let us start by presenting the distinction Sohn-Rethel draws between “societies of 
production” and “societies of appropriation”. When the form of social synthesis is 
determined by the labour relation in the productive process, i.e., receives its 
fundamental structure directly from the human labour process interacting with nature – 
then it is a “society of production” and has the possibility of being a classless society. 
This is the case of “primitive” communities and of a (possible) future communist 
society. People create their own society as producers.91    
Societies of appropriation, in its turn, are based in the appropriation of the labour 
products by the non-working members of society. There are two kinds of appropriation: 
(i) unilateral, in which there is a (public) appropriation by an instituted authority – 
through the levying of tributes or robbery pure and simple – of the surplus produced in 
the context of forms of “direct lordship and bondage”; and (ii) reciprocal, grounded on 
private exchange and commodity production. “The common feature of all societies of 
appropriation is a social synthesis effected by activities which are qualitatively different 
and separated in time from the labour which produces the objects of appropriation”.92 
Broadly speaking, according to Sohn-Rethel93, we can distinguish three major eras 
in the social development of mankind that correspond, in its turn, to three stages in the 
development of thought and knowledge: primitive societies, Bronze Age societies and 
commodity-producing societies (ancient and modern). In synthesizing this historical 
evolution, we will pay special attention to the last type, namely to Ancient Greece and 
modern capitalism.   
   
3.1 – Primitive societies and the Bronze Age 
Tribal society (or primitive communism) corresponds to the emergence of language 
and human consciousness. However, consciousness is here entirely “practical”, i.e., it 
entails the knowledge of how to do things but not the knowledge necessary to explain 
them. Thus, the individual is not able to conceive his existence apart from the social 
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group to which he belongs (tribe, clan, etc.); he does not face nature as an individual 
but, on the contrary, defines in a “magical” way a process that goes completely beyond 
his understanding.94 
Bronze Age civilizations (e.g. Ancient Egypt) correspond to the emergence of 
script and numbers. In these societies, trade does not permeate yet the internal order of 
the community, being carried on essentially with other peoples. Their main intellectual 
developments include: the creation of counting systems to organise the stored goods, the 
establishment of standard measures, astronomy and the calendarisation of floods for 
agricultural purposes, an elementary geometry in order to divide and redistribute the 
arable land, and the creation of written records. Although these elements reveal the 
existence of an intellectual labour separated from manual activities, they do not imply 
nor presuppose yet a mode of conceptual thinking.95  
 
3.2 – Greece: the classical society of appropriation 
Iron metallurgy developed around 1000 BC and gave rise to civilizations like the 
Greek, Etruscan and Roman. Let us quote Thomson: 
 
[B]y increasing productivity and so rendering possible new divisions of labour, the 
use of iron carried still further the process of transforming collective production 
and appropriation into individual production and appropriation. Hence it marked a 
new stage in the growth of commodity production. The village commune, resting 
on common ownership and surrendering its surplus in the form of tribute, was 
succeeded by a community of individual proprietors, each producing independently 
for the open market. Such was the Greek polis, based on the use of iron.96  
 
Commodity exchange originated abstract thought only in late classical antiquity, 
since only in the Greek civilization did it prove itself as an overarching social synthesis. 
Before that there existed only isolated and accidental acts of exchange.97 When 
commercial reality acquired such a large prominence that it led to the invention of 
coinage, around 680 BC, its adverse and disruptive effects permeated the internal order 
of the community.98 The rise of private propriety and exchange among the individuals 
resulted in the transformation of products into commodities and in the creation of a 
social synthesis based on a monetary economy and on private appropriation.99           
This revolution was accompanied by its unique and distinctive form of thought. The 
growth of commodity production in Greece led to the birth of philosophy and the mode 
of conceptual thinking in the Ionian coast of the Aegean Sea (with Thales, 
Anaximander, etc.), the centre of maritime commercial activity.100 The division between 
intellectual and manual labour “becomes a factor of prime importance”.101    
The first “pure thinker” that created (unconsciously) a concept perfectly adequate to 
money was Parmenides with his concept of “the One” (or “that which is”): unchanging 
through time, extended through all space, lacking any sensible properties and strictly 
homogeneous, uniform and incapable of perishing.102 Let us quote Thomson once more:  
 
[M]an, the subject, learnt to abstract himself from the external world, the objet, and 
to see it for the first time as a natural process determined by its own laws, 
independent of his will; yet by the same act of abstraction he nursed in himself the 
illusion that his new categories of thought were endowed with an immanent 
validity independent of the social and historical conditions which had created 
them.103 
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Mathematics and, in particular, the geometry created by the Greeks possessed also a 
purely intellectual and formalized character, apart from any practical connection with 
measurement (as was the case in Egypt, for instance). Measure dissociated itself from 
the act of measurement, which means the manual operation subordinated itself to an act 
of pure thought aimed at apprehending quantitative laws of space or abstract 
numbers.104  
    
Their conceptual content was independent not only from this or that particular 
purpose but from any practical task. […] [A] pure form abstraction had to emerge 
and be admitted into reflective thought. We reason that this could result only 
through the generalisation intrinsic in the monetary commensuration of commodity 
values promoted by coinage.105  
 
Sohn-Rethel concludes that although there was no production of surplus-value in 
the capitalist sense, Ancient Greece”s social synthesis was based on the exchange of 
products as commodities and no more on a communal mode of production. This was 
enough for to the real abstraction to become the dominant feature and imprint its mark 
on the form of thought prevalent in that society and “allow us to trace back the 
conceptual characteristics of Greek philosophy and mathematics […] to this source”.106  
      
3.3 – The Middle Ages and the Renaissance 
With the collapse of the Roman Empire, the forms of commodity production typical 
of classical antiquity came to an end. The economy lost its monetary and slavery 
character and Feudalism emerged, based on an agricultural and artisan small-scale 
production. Individual production took place according to the division of labour inside 
the mediaeval manor.107 
Notwithstanding, the growth, between the IX and XII centuries, of the productive 
forces available to artisans and peasants led to formation of cities and to the rebirth of 
monetary relations, associated to the development of merchant capital. Tributes and 
taxes started to be levied in money, which forced the establishment of a monetary 
economy and of a corresponding reasoning in individuals.108 By the end of the XIV 
century occurs a transition from the modes of artisan production to a pre-capitalist era, 
marked by the Renaissance and the emergence and development of natural sciences.109   
In result of the commercial revolution in the Middle Ages – which grew deeper and 
deeper in the following centuries – a change occurred from individual production to 
social production on an ever wider scale. The formation of urban communities in late 
Feudalism entailed the need of communal walls and defences, administrative buildings, 
cathedrals, roads, bridges, water-supply and drainage systems, etc. These developments 
were responsible for a series of activities that the limited economic, technical and 
theoretic resources of artisan production could no longer meet.110  
Above all, the craftsmen lacked a fundamental qualification to solve the problems 
posed by the dawn of a new era: the abstract thought embodied in mathematics, that is, 
“the logic of socialised thought”. If capital started to exert its influence on production, 
mathematics came to dominate the intellectual powers of social production: for the first 
time there was a large-scale applied-use of science.111 Mathematics opens a gap 
between thought and human action, “establishing an unambiguous division of head and 
hand in the production processes”.112           
More than any other factor, “it was the development of firearms which imposed the 
use of mathematics on artisanry. […] [T]he technology of firearms […], from the 
second half of the fifteenth century [on], intensified and accelerated technological 
developments enormously”.113 The use of firearms raised crucial problems, such as, for 
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example, the relation between explosive power, weight of the cannons and the range of 
projectiles, solvable only with resource to mathematics. Furthermore, firearms 
production increases melt-casting, (ore) mining and the demands on transportation. 
Military architecture acquired also a greater importance in view of the protection of 
harbours and cities. And let us remember that all these developments were accompanied 
by the establishment of a monetary economy on an unprecedented scale.114     
 
4 – Capitalism and the birth of modern science 
It is possible to “understand the historical and logical genesis of the exact sciences 
as an essential part of the capitalist relations of production”.115 The mathematical and 
experimental method of Galileo allowed knowledge of nature from other sources than 
manual labour: this is the key feature of modern science, since “with a technology 
dependent on the knowledge of the workers the capitalist mode of production would be 
an impossibility”.116   
The decisive factor for the emergence of exact sciences was the extension of the 
concept of inertia to movement by Galileo, thereby creating the science of dynamics. 
Galileo open the way to the application of mathematics to the calculation of natural 
phenomena, being a forerunner of Newtonian mechanics. He demonstrated that the 
phenomena could be isolated from uncontrolled environmental influences and tested 
experimentally.    
The principle of inertial motion states that a body remains in movement as long as 
it does not suffer any influence from an external force.117 Therefore, it presupposes: the 
possibility of isolating a body from its physical environment; a conception of infinitely 
homogeneous space (Euclidean geometry); and a conception of movement – and of rest 
– as states present on the same ontological level.118  
 
Our explanation of the principle of inertial motion is that it derives from the pattern 
of motion contained in the real abstraction of commodity exchange. This motion 
has the reality in time and space of the commodity movements in the market, and 
thus of the circulation of money and of capital. The pattern is absolutely abstract, in 
the sense of bearing no shred of perceptible qualities, and was defined as: abstract 
linear movement through abstract, empty, continuous and homogeneous space and 
time of abstract substances which thereby suffer no material change, the movement 
being amenable to no other than mathematical treatment. Although continually 
occurring in our economic life the movement in this description is nor perceivable 
to our private minds. When it does indeed strike our minds it is in a pure 
conceptual form whose source is no longer recognisable; nor is the mechanism to 
which it owes its abstractness.119 
 
In this way, Sohn-Rethel derives the a priori concepts of science, not from an 
external nature, but from the historical nature of man. Let us take once again the 
example of the concept of inertia. In antiquity, in the Middle Ages and still in the 
Renaissance, a static concept of inertia is predominant because the processes of 
exchange are confined to the sphere of circulation (merchant and monetary capital). But 
with the advent of capitalism, a dynamic concept of inertia arises. This stems from the 
fact that the means of production – men and machines – become under the sway of the 
market. “[P]roduction […] [is now a] mingled unity of exchange and production, […] 
constitutes a constant and continuous process functioning as an economically self-
compelling system”.120    
If in the economic realm social power is now capital, in the field of technology it is 
science or, more precisely,  
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the methodical operation of the human mind in its socialised form, guided by its 
specific logic, which is mathematics. This socialised mind of man […] is money 
without its material attachments, therefore immaterial and no longer recognisable 
as money and, indeed no longer being money but the “pure intellect”. In its form as 
money it is capital ruling the labour process […] [and] operates in an automatic 
manner enforcing the embodiment of the labour employed into values containing a 
surplus. In its form as the scientific intellect the socialised mind applies itself to 
physical phenomena on which the automatic working of the labour process of the 
various capitals is found to be depending.121 
 
The pattern of abstraction present in exchange assumed the meaning of the 
“absolute minimum” of what constitutes a (natural) physical event. Any event that may 
be taken as a composite of this minimum is, thus,   
 
conceivable in terms of pure theoretical categories and amenable to full 
mathematical treatment. This is, in fact, how modern science proceeds. Theoretical 
hypotheses in conceptual form and mathematical formulation are worked out and 
tested […] . The phenomenon tested is safeguarded from any touch by human hand 
and made to register specific measurements which are then read as indicated by the 
instruments, and which must be in answer to the questions advanced by the 
hypothesis.122    
 
By virtue of its isolation, a phenomenon can only be subject to investigation outside 
the context in which it occurs. In this way,  
 
modern science is not aimed at helping society in her relations with nature. It 
studies nature only from the viewpoint of capitalist production. If the experiments 
yield a reliable verification of the hypothesis the latter becomes an established “law 
of nature” in the shape of a law of recurrent events. And this is the result the 
capitalist may utilise for technological application in his factory.123  
 
In a remark that has lost nothing in topicality, Sohn-Rethel tells us that the “objects 
over which capital can exercise control must be cast in the form of a commodity. It is 
the exact truth of exact science that it is knowledge of nature in commodity form”.124 In 
this sense, if in the primitive communal modes of production “the social practice was 
rational but the theory was irrational (mythological and anthropomorphic), […] on the 
basis of commodity production the relation was reversed; the social practice has turned 
irrational (out of man’s control) but his mode of thinking has assumed rational 
forms”.125  
Sohn-Rethel is still able to understand the potentialities of automation, although not 
relating it to the supersession of labour. It is obviously necessary to redefine the relation 
of man to automation, but      
 
now man would, in principle, have at his disposal production forces which in 
themselves embrace in their physical reality the socialisation which in the ages of 
commodity production has grown up in the intellectual work of the human mind - 
that is, in science. This is a reversal in the relationship between man and his tool. 
The tools are the repositories of his social potentialities and man can remain an 
individual using these tools to satisfy his needs and wishes with as yet 
unforeseeable horizons. It is clear that this assumes socialism in the place of 
capitalism.126  
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Socialism must establish an alliance between society and nature through a science 
grounded on the unity of intellectual and manual labour.127 In a socialist society science 
will be, methodologically speaking, the same as it is today. However, socialism will 
have the means to contravene the nefarious features science possesses under capitalism: 
the fact the scientific categories stem from the second nature and are completely 
alienated from the qualitative realities of the primary nature; the fact that science is 
forced to isolate its objects from the environment in which they are embedded; and the 
fact of being a purely intellectual activity.128  
The associated producers will control the material and intellectual means of 
production, concerting it in order to establish a true symbiosis with nature at a global 
level. “[T]he material practice of the people in their social exploits commands the need 
for scientific findings to be integrated into the relationship of society to nature”. The 
findings will no longer remain disconnected; instead, they will be always combined and 
will regulate “collective interaction with nature”.129   
According to Sohn-Rethel, in a socialist society science will lose its unilaterally 
intellectual character. The breakthroughs achieved by science, during the XX century, 
seem not adequate anymore to the rationality underlying capitalism, 
 
for it has unleashed natural powers which capital fails to control [and “to make a 
profit out of it”, that is, to cast it in the form of value, N.M.].  Thus if we remain in 
the clutches of capitalism we are threatened with the loss of the social rationality of 
science which capitalism formerly possessed and may find ourselves with the 
irrationality of our social practice combined with no less an irrationality of our 
theory. […] [M]an has reached a crossroad where he is faced with the alternative 
either of taking the socialist road and perhaps achieving a rationality of both social 
practice and theory or continuing on the capitalist road and forfeiting both.130 
 
5 – Sohn-Rethel and the New Value Critique 
5.1 – The false ontologisation of labour 
Classical “labour movement Marxism”131 was always trapped in a foreshortened 
critique of capitalism, grounded in an understanding of capitalism merely on the basis 
of (juridical) private propriety of the means of production and on the corresponding 
“subjective” exploitation of the workers by the capitalists through the appropriation of 
the surplus-value they produce. Thus, this situation calls for the “expropriation the 
expropriators”, claiming back from the “parasites of society” the surplus-value 
produced by “honest productive labour”. And the instrument for this, “the motor of 
history”, is constituted by “class struggle”, by the elevation of the proletariat to the 
status of “historical subject” responsible by the construction of a society grounded on an 
ontology of labour. Ultimately, this stands fundamentally as a critique of distribution – 
in other words, of circulation – that opposes the “anarchy of the market” to the 
centralised planning and allocation of the labour(-time) of society.          
New Value Critique132 (NVC) calls this the theory of “exoteric” Marx. Opposed to 
it is the “esoteric” core of Marx’s theory: the scandal is no longer the “theft” by the 
capitalists of the surplus-value produced by the workers, but the production of value 
itself and labour itself as the substance of value. Recovering Marx’s theory of fetishism, 
the NVC undertakes a radical critique of the “modern commodity-producing system”, 
emphasizing the necessity of abolishing its basic categories which tend to be 
ontologised, including by “Marxists”: value, commodity, labour, State, market, etc. It is 
no more a question of “class struggle” but instead of a struggle against an impersonal, 
quasi-objective133 form of domination, transformed in an “automatic subject” and that 
eludes men’s control and subjugates them. It is no longer the case of freeing labour but 
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of freeing ourselves from labour; human emancipation will come about not from the 
elevation of labour to the supreme principle of humanity, but from its abolition, from 
the liberation of the “interchange or metabolism with nature” (Marx) and the production 
of material wealth from the shackles of value and of the abstraction labour qua reified 
human sociability, from the madness of a “real metaphysics”.  
By recovering Marx’s analysis of the commodity form and Marx’s theory of 
fetishism, Sohn-Rethel takes place among the forerunners of this current.134 However, 
as we have already seen, one of his central ideas is that “the abstraction stems from the 
relation of circulation between men”.135 For the author,  
 
neither labour is abstract by nature, nor is it abstraction to “abstract human labour” 
its own product. Labour does not abstract itself. The abstraction is placed outside 
labour, in the social form of relationship typical of the relations of exchange. […] 
[Exchange] abstracts (or, better put, abstractifies) labour. The result of this relation 
is the value of commodities.136  
 
And in another place he adds that it cannot be acknowledged  
 
to the value-form of commodities any inherent relation to labour. […] [Therefore,] 
the decisive factor present in commodity production is that on its basis socialisation 
does not root its social character in the labour process […], but in a formalised and 
generalised system of appropriation as circulation of exchange. […] In other 
words, the abstraction of the commodities is an exchange abstraction, not a labour 
abstraction.
137 
 
In this way, as it is easily understood from what has been said before, this assertion 
constitutes the main target of NVC”s objections to the Sohn-Rethelian oeuvre138. 
Therefore, we will now briefly present the major criticisms levelled by some of its key-
authors to Sohn-Rethel: Robert Kurz claims that the fetishism of value permeates the 
entire process of capitalist social reproduction; Moishe Postone argues that only in 
capitalism is “labour” responsible by the social synthesis; and Norbert Trenkle 
demystifies the supposed “innocence” or neutrality of the concept of concrete labour.       
Kurz acknowledges that Sohn-Rethel’s theory was the first to introduce the concept 
of real abstraction in the Marxist debate. Notwithstanding, “for him the socially 
objectified abstraction is real only as an “exchange abstraction” […] . It is only in the 
market that abstract labour presents itself as the common substance of the commodities 
which makes them compatible”.139 In other words, “abstract labour […] is treated 
implicitly as a concept of circulation […] [located] beyond the sphere of production”.140   
 
This amounts […] to the subdivision of the capitalist process of reproduction into 
an ontological-transhistorical sphere of concrete labour, of the process of material 
production, on the one hand, and a specifically capitalist sphere of exchange, of the 
market, of the “anarchic” regulation of the market, on the other hand, the point 
being to “set free” the ontologised sphere of production from the specifically 
capitalist sphere of circulation […] . Paradoxically, “labour” as “labour in its 
specifically capitalist form” [abstract labour], “converts” itself thus not in labour 
itself, and likewise, not in the effective expenditure of labour power in the real 
production process, but only in its social beyond, as a process of exchange or act of 
the market situated outside labour, when it is not even active labour anymore but 
only its fetishistic reflection in the products as commodities.141     
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We should notice that the “fetish form of value […] comprises the whole process of 
social reproduction”.142 In Sohn-Rethel, value is relegated to an “ex post process of 
abstraction”, so that the author has to conceive the “double character of labour 
represented in the commodities” as split into two distinct spheres, “instead of 
determining the character of the whole reproduction: in production we find no other 
than ‘concrete’ or ‘useful’ labour, while the product in the form of the commodity arises 
only in circulation as the representation of abstract labour”.143 
This quid pro quo stems from the fact of labour not being itself – as Sohn-Rethel 
thinks – something natural, being “precisely in its quality of products of labour that 
things are already commodities or products of the real abstraction, and not only through 
the act of exchange in the market”.144 Kurz concludes therefore that even though Sohn-
Rethel reached further than the “labour movement Marxism” and should be    
 
given credit for, with his concept of real abstraction, having developed the 
theoretical consciousness of the problem, something that constituted a landmark, he 
remains trapped in an ontology of labour and, thus, to a concept of real abstraction 
limited to circulation, which furthermore binds him to a schism of the concept of 
labour into a bad, a posteriori and purely circulatory abstraction, on the one hand, 
and a “good”, productive and supposedly ontological concretion, on the other.145  
 
According to Postone, although Sohn-Rethel attempts to analyse the “structures of 
thought […] in terms of their constitution by forms of social synthesis”, he does not 
grasp “the specificity of labour in capitalism as being socially constituting”.146 Thus, 
Sohn-Rethel claims that “the sort of abstraction and form of social synthesis entailed in 
the value form is not a labour abstraction but an exchange abstraction”.147 Postone 
argues that Sohn-Rethel    
 
does not relate the notion of labour abstraction to the creation of alienated social 
structures. Instead, he evaluates positively the mode of social synthesis […] 
effected by labor in industrial production as non-capitalist and opposes it to the 
mode of societalisation effected by exchange, which he assesses negatively. The 
latter mode of social synthesis alone […] constitutes the essence of capitalism.148  
 
However, the “historically specific quality” of labour in capitalism refers precisely 
to the fact that it performs the social synthesis, something unknown in the societies of 
the past. Therefore, it is the specificity of the capitalist process of production and the 
“alienated social structures” created by the socialisation mediated by labour which are 
responsible for the real abstraction and not a purported (commodity) exchange extrinsic 
to the productive process and to labour.149  
Postone applauds the Sohn-Rethelian attempt “to relate the historical emergence of 
abstract thought, philosophy, and natural science to abstract social forms”.150 
Nonetheless, his equivocated interpretation about the character and constitution of those 
forms ends up undermining his “sophisticated attempt at an epistemological reading of 
Marx”s categories”.151    
According to Trenkle, labour is not an “anthropological constant”152 but, on the 
contrary, is “a powerful real abstraction historically imposed, which coerces people 
under its violent power”.153 Thus,  
 
 labour, as the specific form of activity of commodity society, is already per se 
abstract because it constitutes a sphere separated/abstracted [abgezogene] from the 
remaining social context. And, as such, it only exists in general where commodity 
production has already transformed itself in the determining form of socialisation; 
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that is, in capitalism, where human activity in the form of labour does not serve any 
other goal than the valorisation of value.154     
 
With the concept of real abstraction, Sohn-Rethel describes “a process of 
abstraction that is not executed through the consciousness of people as an act of 
thought, but which it is presupposed in thinking and acting as an a priori structure of 
social synthesis and which determines them.” Nevertheless, to the author, the real 
abstraction is connected exclusively to the act of commodity exchange through the 
“functional bond of the market”.155  
In this sense, the sphere of labour appears to him  
 
as a pre-social space in which the private producers still fabricate their products 
completely uninfluenced by any socially determined form. It is only a posteriori 
that they launch their products as commodities into the sphere of circulation, 
where, then, in exchange, abstraction is made from their material particularities 
(and with this, indirectly, from the concrete labour expended on their production) 
and they thus become the carriers of value. This point of view, which separates the 
sphere of production from circulation through an external opposition, does not 
grasp the internal nexus of the modern commodity-producing system.156 
 
For Trenkle, the crux of the matter is that  
 
the products are not fabricated in the capitalist process of production as innocent 
useful things that reach the market a posteriori, but each process of production is 
beforehand directed to the valorisation of capital and correspondingly organised. 
This means that the products are already fabricated in the fetishist form of the 
value-thing; they should concern only one aim: to represent the abstract labour-
time expended in its production in the value form. The sphere of circulation […] is 
the place in which the value represented in the products is realised or at least 
should be realised.157  
 
Obviously the commodities must also be useful things, but the sensible/material 
body of the commodity (“use-value”) is not the primary goal of capitalist production; it 
constitutes an “unavoidable side effect”, since “value does not realise itself without a 
material carrier”.158 It can thus be claimed that the “concrete” side of labour does not 
rest unspoiled by the “presupposed form of socialisation”. “If abstract labour is the 
abstraction of an abstraction, then, concrete labour represents only the paradox of being 
the concrete side of an abstraction (that is, of the form-abstraction ‘labour’)”.159 In this 
way, it is “concrete” only in the sense that different commodities “need materially 
different processes of production” which, however, do not “function technically and 
organisationally” in a neutral way “regarding the implicit goal of valorisation.” We can 
say that “the concrete-material side of labour is … nothing more than the palpable form 
in which the dictatorship of abstract labour-time confronts and coerces the activity of 
the workers under its rhythm”.160       
Let us sum up, then, Trenkle’s critique of Sohn-Rethel: “the commodities produced 
by the system of abstract labour already represent value even if they have not entered 
yet the sphere of circulation”.161 This is so because to be able to enter the process of 
circulation (“market”), the products (“commodities”) must already “find themselves in 
the fetishistic form of the value-thing”.162   
  
5.2 – Scientific knowledge and the “bourgeois subject” 
19 
 
If there is a clear disagreement regarding the origin of the real abstraction (in 
capitalism), the “epistemological” aspect stricto sensu of Sohn-Rethel’s theory seems to 
be more at one with the theory of NVC. According to Ortlieb, the “structural relations 
between the mathematical-scientific method […] and the logic of commodity society, in 
its actual developed form” seem to make “Sohn-Rethel’s [epistemological] program 
clearly viable”163, although it may be objected that the same predecessors of industrial 
capital – merchant and interest capital – arose also in other societies (in China or in 
India, for instance), “without thought taking the same course it took in the West and, 
furthermore, without emerging an independent capitalist dynamic”.164   
Even though natural science presents itself as a “value-neutral science”, it 
constitutes in fact a historically specific product.165 As Sohn-Rethel had already noted, 
the scientific method – from Galileo and Newton to our days – does not derive primarily 
from observation, but from mathematical propositions and non-empirical concepts.166 
Ortlieb tells us, in a statement clearly at one with Sohn-Rethel, that, for example, “the 
idea of universal natural laws of nature presupposes an objective concept of linear time 
infinitely divisible, as well as a concept of homogeneous space”.167  
The “revolution of the mode of thinking” that emerged along with Modernity 
introduced “a reason which is specific of the bourgeois epoch”, so that the “objective 
knowledge” produced in this society is not an “a-historical knowledge, independent of 
the forms of society and valid in equal measure to all human beings”.168 We can say that 
“scientific thinking [...] ended up by imposing itself thanks to the power of commodity 
society”.169  
 Ortlieb bases his analysis primarily in the (bourgeois) subject-form, being visible 
some similarities with Sohn-Rethel’s analysis, which already in 1937, in his “Critical 
Liquidation of Apriorism”, wrote that the concept of subjectivity refers to the “subject 
of knowledge”. In this sense, “the thought of the subject of knowledge presupposes a 
kind of self-reflection, through which the individual distinguishes ‘himself’ as a 
thinking being from his body and from all that is material in space and thinks himself as 
identical through time”.170 His thesis is that subjectivity relates to the “economic 
substitutability of the function of money as monetary material”, so that the theoretical 
subject arises from the identification of man with money. “The theoretical subject is the 
possessor of money”.171 And he adds further on:   
 
As a possessor of money [the individual] identifies himself as immaterial subject of 
validity in the function of identically uniform and general money,  as well as a 
purely material body in the stuff of his money, creating therefrom the Dasein of his 
subjectivity and his valid actions. Through the validity of his thought, the possessor 
of money is identical with all other possessors of money.172   
 
Ortlieb develops these Sohn-Rethelian intuitions in the following manner, which 
deserves to be quoted fully: 
 
The nexus that holds together commodity society and the objective form of 
knowledge is the bourgeois subject, i.e., the specific constitution of consciousness 
which, on the one hand, is required in order to survive in the commodity and 
monetised society, and which, on the other hand, the subject must possess in order 
to be capable of [achieving] objective knowledge. 
Commodity form […] has converted itself in the universal form because capitalism 
has turned labour power into a commodity whose carriers may dispose freely: that 
is, free from personal domination, free from all coercion except that which forces 
them to earn money. But this impersonal coercion is universal […] and the sale of 
their own labour power [has converted itself] in the predominant form of 
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reproduction. […] The necessity of possessing the larger amount of money as 
possible converts itself therefore into the ultimate “self-interest”, equal for all 
members of society, although they must pursue it by competing with each other 
[…].       
The apparent autonomy of the individual corresponds to the apparent neutrality of 
the economic process, which presents itself to the economic monads as a process 
ruled by laws, describable only with the concepts of theory […] borrowed from the 
natural sciences. In both ways, the bourgeois subject is unaware of his own social 
condition: without further obligations than to ensure his livelihood (which, 
however, he cannot achieve as an individual), he feeds with his abstract labour the 
mega-machine of the valorisation of capital, of whose functioning, on the other 
hand, he does not take any responsibility, since he experiences it as ruled by natural 
laws inaccessible to his own agency.173            
 
As we have already seen, the nexus between the possibility of objective knowledge 
and the consciousness of self-identity was underlined by Hume and Kant. According to 
Ortlieb, and once more at one with Sohn-Rethel, “the consciousness of identity cannot 
be deduced from experience” since it precedes “all empirical knowledge”. But it is not 
also “something inborn to the human being as such, but [something] constituted 
socially”, requiring “the constitution of a subject capable of objective knowledge”.174  
Ortlieb sets out this subject by examining the demands inherent to modern scientific 
method. Scientific experiments are, first and foremost, “an intervention of experimenter 
on himself: the elimination of his corporeity and of his feelings”, in order to ensure the 
“elimination of the subjective factor”, i.e., the illusion that the subject, after all, has 
nothing to do with a purely objective, technical process of knowledge.175  
Nevertheless, all experimental acts and measurements constitute a reciprocal 
relationship “between the subject that knows and the nature which he turns into his 
object”, mediated precisely by the scientific mathematical method. This means that a 
“scientific experiment” never refers itself simply to a “‘nature-in-itself’ but uniquely to 
this specific form of interaction”, so that the so-called laws of nature are not mere 
“products of discourse” multipliable ad infinitum, “not in the need of its objective side, 
nor mere proprieties of nature, which have nothing to do with the knowing subjects”.176 
In short, “the schism of individual peculiarities” to which the subject of knowledge has 
to submit himself in order not to compromise an experiment is the equivalent to that 
which “the objects of his contemplation, in the mathematical abstraction of the mental 
experiment, are submitted: abstraction is made from all its qualities and even from every 
concrete thing”.177  
Thus, Ortlieb, concludes that  
 
The illusion that makes the regularity produced by the experiment appear as a 
propriety of nature itself is the same illusion by which the blind social process of 
commodity society presents itself to men like a process ruled by laws, external to 
themselves, when indeed it is them who constitute it through their action as 
bourgeois subjects. The subject as a “conscious agent which is not conscious of his 
own form” [Kurz] conceives himself as separated from nature and from all other 
subjects, whom he experiences as mere “external world”; in this way it is 
unconsciously presupposed the total social framework, specific to bourgeois 
society, the only one to produce such form of consciousness. The systemic nexus 
of commodity-form, objectified that way, constitutes also the equality of subjects 
that the objective form of knowledge presupposes: their equality as commoditised 
and monetary monads, adult and responsible citizens, endowed with equal rights 
and submitted to identical rules and laws.178  
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6 – Conclusion 
Throughout his work, Sohn-Rethel demonstrates that  
 
Natural science, like mathematics, […] is a functional part of a particular 
form of the social life-process. Its logic is based on the abstraction from our 
own timebound existential condition, […] on the abstraction of society from 
itself. It is from this abstraction, not from any absolute root and spontaneous 
“intellectual” font, that the logic of science derives its character of 
timelessness. There is, in other words, a timebound cause for timeless 
logic.
179  
Thus, Sohn-Rethel does not simply derivate the cognitive concepts from the 
material world or “external” nature, but “from the social being of the historical epochs 
in which these concepts arise and play their part”.180 The mode of conceptual thinking 
emerged, historically, from the division between intellectual and manual labour 
associated to commodity production. Intellectual labour has a basic characteristic: its 
“timeless universal logic”, which makes it incompatible with history, social as well as 
natural. In this way,    
 
Timeless concepts are ahistorical in their meaning and present themselves as 
historical miracles like the “Greek miracle” […]. Of course, this ahistorical mode 
of thinking is itself a historical phenomenon. And so long as its timeless and 
nonempirical concepts fail to be understood historically, history itself remains 
incomprehensible.181 
 
In short, Sohn-Rethel is able to disclose  
 
the origin of the pure intellectual concepts from the spatio-temporal reality of 
social being, their character as reflections of the abstraction enshrined in money, 
hence their nature as offshoots from the reification upon which hinges the cohesion 
of exchange society, their essential use as forms of socialised thinking, their 
antithetic relation to manual labour, their accessory link with the class division of 
society.182  
 
Concerning the role and form the natural sciences may assume in a post-capitalist 
society, we can conclude with Ortlieb that 
 
 As natural sciences expand the possibilities of human action, they constitute a 
useful tool that we should not renounce. But “natural science as the religion of our 
times” (Pietschmann), which elevates to a propriety of nature itself the regularity 
produced by the objective form of knowledge and sets up as a worldview a nature 
ruled by laws, determining what we see and do not see, this science will not 
survive the modern age. The image of “nature” was always a socially constituted 
image; and we do not see why a society freed from all abstract-universal and 
unconscious forms would still need a unitary image of nature, mandatory for 
everyone in the same way and at all times.
183  
 
Despite all its unquestionable merits, Sohn-Rethelian theory presents, as we saw in 
section 5, obvious limitations stemming fundamentally from its equation of labour with 
the metabolism with nature. Sohn-Rethel’s definition of capitalism as a “society of 
appropriation” transfers the capitalist specificity to the sphere of circulation – to the 
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“exploitation” through the appropriation of the products of labour by the non-workers – 
and moves the real abstraction from the sphere of production to the sphere of exchange. 
Therefore, what differentiates capitalism in not (“abstract”) labour but precisely the fact 
of the social synthesis not being performed, in his view, by labour (!) but by the process 
of commodity exchange. It is not abstract labour and value that impose themselves as 
the dominant mode of production; rather, it is the “logic” of the market that invades (an 
ontologised) production.       
Sohn-Rethel ends up not realising that the capitalist process of production is 
simultaneously: a process of material production (of goods) and a process of production 
of value, i.e., a process of “valorisation of value” through the subsumption of “living 
labour”. Thus, it is not the “market” that becomes co-extensive with society but 
“abstract labour” and commodity production.   
Instead of abolishing labour, Sohn-Rethel intends to “plan” it and allocate it in a 
“conscious” matter, as opposed to the “anarchy” of the market, which effects that 
quantification “indirectly and in an unconscious matter” as a result of the “social 
exchange process”.184 By ontologising labour, the author is even able of concluding that 
Taylorism itself is already a crucial step towards socialism (!): if “his analysis 
[Taylor’s] was done in the service of capital […], the method need not serve this 
objective, nor be wielded by capital as a means of enforcing its control over labour. It 
could even be a method operated by the workers themselves”.185 We are here before the 
most “exoteric” core of Sohn-Rethelian theory, to use an expression of NVC.  
Besides that, and lastly, we should note that it is not only “intellectual labour” 
which constitutes a social a priori. In Marx, (abstract) labour tout court and the 
commodity constitute an a priori from the root: they express simultaneously particular 
social relations and forms of thought.186 Thus, the “form of thought” of all “modern 
monetary subjects”187 constitutes an (unconscious) a priori marked by the “commodity 
form”, value, labour and the (ir)rationality inherent to them, which determines and 
frames their daily actions and behaviours. By ontologising labour, Sohn-Rethel has to 
move the specificity of capitalism to the realm of exchange and to an “intellectual 
labour” in the service of the “ruling class”.         
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